Remittances and democratization by Escriba-Folch, Abel et al.
  
Abel Escribà-Folch, Covadonga Meseguer, and 
Joseph Wright 
Remittances and democratization 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Escriba-Folch, Abel, Meseguer, Covadonga and Wright, Joseph (2015) Remittances and 
democratization. International Studies Quarterly, 59 (3). pp. 571-586. ISSN 0020-8833  
 
DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12180 
 
© 2015 International Studies Association 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63711/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: September 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Remittances and Democratization 
 
Abel Escribà-Folch, Covadonga Meseguer, and Joseph Wright 
June 26, 2014 
 
Abstract 
Do remittances stabilize autocracies? Remittances, or money sent by foreign workers to 
individuals in their home country, differ from other sources of external non-tax revenue such 
as foreign aid because they accrue directly to individuals and thus raise the incomes of 
households. We argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by 
undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party-based regimes. Remittances 
therefore make voters less dependent on state transfers in autocracies. As a result, autocracies 
that rely heavily on the broad-based distribution of spoils for their survival, namely party-
based regimes, should be especially vulnerable to increases in remittances. Evidence 
consistent with this argument suggests that remittances can promote democratization in some 
dictatorships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Research on the economic consequences of immigration for receiving countries is immense 
and inconclusive.
1
 Some examine the political consequences of immigration in advanced 
countries, exploring, for example, the circumstances under which immigration leads to 
conflict (Dancygier 2010); the challenges to democracies of ascendant anti-immigrant groups 
(Messina 2007); and the risks of cultural backlash (Huntington 2004; Collier 2013). 
Furthermore, the economic impact of remittances, the transfer of funds associated with out-
migration, has also been the subject of enormous attention from economists and policy-
makers (e.g. Kapur and McHale 2005, 2012; World Bank 2006). However, the other side of 
this phenomenon, the political consequences of out-migration for sending countries, remains 
largely understudied (Meseguer and Burgess 2014). Only recently have political scientists 
started to ask questions about how out-migration influences political change, and in particular 
democratization (Kapur 2010; Moses 2011; Pfutze 2012). Our paper addresses this second 
side of migration by examining the macropolitical consequences of remittance income for the 
survival of autocratic regimes, focusing on the prospects of democratic transition. 
This paper shows that remittances can advance democracy in some autocratic 
contexts. We argue that worker remittances erode electoral support for autocratic incumbents 
in party-based regimes by undermining their capacity to mobilize and buy support through 
the delivery of goods and services to individuals. The democratizing effect of remittances 
should therefore be most consequential in regimes that rely primarily on the broad-based 
delivery of patronage and public goods to retain electoral support from a large coalition – 
namely dominant party regimes. 
The size of remittance flows and the fact that this income comes from outside the 
receiving country have led some scholars to compare remittances with other revenue 
windfalls such as foreign aid and oil. Numerous studies find that foreign aid and oil rents may 
make autocracies more resilient by providing rulers with non-tax revenues that reduce the 
need for taxation and that generate revenue that can be spent to buy political support or 
repress dissent.
2
 Some studies similarly suggest that remittances negatively influence 
democracy via the same mechanisms, such as patronage or rentierism, through which oil 
rents and aid harm democratic development.
3
 Recent research also argues that governments 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, the review by Orrenius and Zavodny (2012). 
2
 On the negative effect of non-tax revenue, oil, and aid on democracy and authoritarian survival see, among 
many others Ross (2001); Smith (2004); Ulfelder (2007); Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008); Smith 
(2008); Kono and Montinola (2009); Morrison (2009); Omgba (2009) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
(2010). 
3
 Recent research, however, has begun to question the empirical foundations of the political aid curse, finding 
that aid is associated with a higher likelihood of democratic transition during the post-Cold War period 
3 
 
use remittances to divert resources that are then used to finance patronage. Consistent with 
this claim, Abdih et al. (2012) find that remittances lead to lower institutional quality and 
worsen corruption, while Ahmed (2012) finds that aid and remittances stabilize autocratic 
governments.
4
 
Yet remittances differ from aid and oil in ways which, we argue, make them distinct 
from other sources of foreign revenue. First, remittances are private transfers sent by 
individuals living and working abroad; migrants, not foreign governments or companies, are 
therefore the main source of remittances. Further, remittance transfers do not accrue to 
governments – like natural resource revenue or fungible aid – but directly to individuals, 
households, and organizations within a country. We build on the implications of these 
differences to explain how remittances influence political change in recipient countries. 
We show that in some contexts remittances advance political development by 
fostering democratization. Worker remittances undermine the capacity of autocratic regimes 
to mobilize electoral support through the delivery of goods and services to voters. The 
democratizing effect of remittances should therefore be strongest in dominant party regimes 
that rely primarily on the broad based delivery of patronage and public goods to retain 
electoral support from a large coalition. Although other dictatorships also use patronage, we 
expect remittances to have a weaker influence on political change in these regimes because 
they generally have smaller support coalitions and thus rely less on the long-term transfer of 
state resources to large groups within society. Further, many non-party based regimes do not 
allow organized opposition parties to directly challenge the regime by competing for power 
in regular elections. Using data on up to 137 autocratic regimes from 1975-2009, we find that 
remittances increase the likelihood of a democratic transition in dominant party regimes. To 
explore the mechanism linking remittances to autocratic regime survival, we examine how 
remittances influence electoral behavior in autocracies, and find evidence that remittances are 
associated with lower electoral support for incumbent regimes. 
 
The Political Consequences of Remittances 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Dunning 2004; Wright 2009; Bermeo 2011). Further, studies that account for country-specific factors question 
the empirical link between oil and democratization (Haber and Menaldo 2011; Wright, Frantz and Geddes 
2014). 
4
 However, Tyburski (2012) reports a negative association between remittances and corruption in Mexican 
states. 
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Remittance flows to developing countries amounted to $325 billion in 2010 and continue to 
grow, according to the World Bank.
5
 Foreign remittances have exceeded official aid flows 
and non-FDI private capital inflows to low- and middle-income countries since the late 1990s 
(Chami et al. 2008, 12). These patterns are also found in autocratic regimes. Further, 
remittance inflows are on average less volatile than other non-tax resources such as oil rents 
and foreign aid.
6
 Figure 1 shows that average oil income in autocracies remained steady 
through the 1990s and increased in the past decade as oil prices have risen. While remittances 
have also risen with oil prices in the 2000s, foreign aid to autocracies has not evidenced the 
same spike. The rise of remittances in the past two decades means that some countries’ 
economies have become increasingly dependent on these flows. In countries as diverse as 
Albania, Lesotho, Haiti, and Jordan, remittances constitute more than 15 percent of GDP. Do 
these flows have political consequences for receiving countries? 
 
***Figure 1 about here*** 
Figure 1: Foreign income in autocracies. Average per capita level of foreign income across 
all autocracies in Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). Figures depict the two-year moving 
average of constant US dollars. Aid and remittances data from World Bank (2010) and oil 
rents data from Ross (2008). 
 
 Relying on work by sociologists and anthropologists, political scientists are now 
exploring how patterns of transnational engagement influence political attitudes and 
behaviors in home countries as well as how emigrants exert “voice” after “exit” (Hirschman 
1978; Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Iskander 2010; Careja and Emmenegger 2012; Meseguer 
and Burgess 2014). Abundant case studies show that emigrants engage in the politics of their 
home countries (Levitt 1998; Kapur 2010). Yet, we know little about the macro-political 
consequences of this transnational engagement for sending countries, as most studies focus 
on one country – mainly Mexico – or use individual-level data. 
 One group of studies uses survey data asking respondents about their migratory 
experience including receiving remittances – and political behavior. Other research examines 
how remittances affect electoral outcomes, such as voting for incumbent parties. Whereas the 
first set of papers finds that emigration has a demobilizing effect, the second shows that 
remittances generally reduce electoral support for incumbent parties and thus may further 
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 This figure only includes transfers made through formal channels. See the World Bank’s “Outlook for 
Remittance Flows 2011-2013.” 
6
 Since 1970, for example, the average standard deviation of remittances within autocratic countries is $15 per 
capita. This figure is $25 per capita for aid and over $500 per capita for oil income. 
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political change. Extant research therefore associates remittances with both decreased 
political mobilization and increased political change at the same time. In this section we 
review the mechanisms for these two opposing effects and then, in the next section, discuss 
how these mechanisms influence the prospects of democratization in different autocratic 
contexts. 
 Using a variety of surveys based on Mexican respondents, Pérez-Armendáriz and 
Crow (2010), Goodman and Hiskey (2008), and Germano (2013) find that emigration 
experience reduces certain types of political behavior, such as voting, talking about politics, 
punishing incumbent parties in elections, and seeking political information. Two mechanisms 
may explain these findings. First, Goodman and Hiskey (2008, 170) posit that having 
relatives abroad and receiving remittances reorient individuals toward transnational political 
activities as they rely more on families and less on the state to satisfy their needs. Second, 
and more importantly, remittances may insulate recipient households from domestic 
economic conditions and thus reduce economic grievances. Remittances usually accrue to 
households in countercyclical patterns, which helps to smooth domestic economic shocks and 
consumption volatility. This might reduce dissatisfaction with the incumbent regime and 
preclude political change, perhaps by lowering the risk of civil war (Regan and Frank 2014). 
 In contrast, other studies contend that remittances foster political change, and even 
democratization, via three main mechanisms: an income effect, contentious mobilization, and 
social learning. First, remittances increase recipient households’ income, which in turn 
augments resources necessary for political participation, such as time and money. One 
version of this argument posits that additional non-labor income in the form of remittances 
makes individuals less dependent on the state’s clientelistic spending, prompting individuals 
to reduce their electoral support for incumbent parties or to engage in other forms of 
participation such as protests. For example, using municipal election data in Mexico, Pfutze 
(2012; 2013) tests the social learning and the income mechanism but only finds support for 
the latter: remittances reduce turnout for the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 
in municipalities where the PRI was entrenched. Similarly, Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and 
Weingast (2003) show that a higher percentage of a municipal population living in the U.S. – 
a proxy for remittances – is associated with a higher likelihood that a municipality defects 
from the PRI and votes for the opposition. 
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 Second, remittances may be used to support particular candidates and parties in 
receiving countries or to finance protest activities back home.
7
 Remittances can thus 
influence domestic politics in sending countries when they are used to directly fund 
opposition political groups. Migrant diasporas, for example, can be a key source of financing 
for domestic rebel groups, which may increase the feasibility of an armed uprising and, as a 
result, raise the likelihood of civil conflict (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004). Using survey data 
from sub-Saharan Africa, Dionne, Inman and Montinola (2014) show that individuals who 
report receiving remittances are more likely to participate in protests but less likely to vote 
than those who receive no remittances. In more institutionalized polities, remittances can 
finance legal opposition parties and thus increase their capacity to challenge the incumbents 
in elections.
8
 Others find that emigrant remittances can increase the resources available for 
collective challenges to the state, increasing the risk of civil war (Miller and Ritter 2014). 
 Third, remittances may involve the transfer of “social remittances”, which consist of 
the flow of new ideas, values, and behaviors from migrants to their sending countries (Levitt 
1998). The transfer of social remittances occurs through long-distance cross-border 
interactions, face-to-face cross-border interactions, and migration information networks 
(Levitt 1998; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz 2014). Thus, contact with 
emigrant relatives may increase participation and dissent through a process of social learning 
via the spillover of civic and democratic values, which can alter the distribution of political 
preferences and behaviors in sending communities (Pfutze 2012, 2013; Pérez-Armendáriz 
2014). For example, Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) find that knowing migrants – 
whether friends or relatives – increases levels of political participation and dissatisfaction 
with incumbents in Mexico. 
 Most research to date focuses on how remittances influence politics in new 
democracies and specifically Mexico (Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Pérez-Armendáriz and 
Crow 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz 2014; Pfutze 2013; Germano 2013; Tyburski 2012).
9
 
However, research on the political influence of remittances need not be restricted to 
democratic settings (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast 2003; Pfutze 2012). The only 
paper that examines remittances and macro-political change using a broad sample of 
                                                          
7
 See Burgess (2014) for a study of the determinants of migrants' political engagement in their home countries' 
politics. 
8
 Indeed, recent cross-national research demonstrates that emigrants send more money home at election time in 
developing countries, especially during multiparty contests (O’Mahony 2013;Nyblade and O’Mahony 2014). 
However, these studies do not clarify whether the funds go to finance the incumbents, the legal opposition, or 
other types of groups. 
9
 See Meseguer and Burgess (2014) for a review. 
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autocracies is Ahmed (2012), which examines two types of foreign income together: aid and 
remittances.
10
 This study posits that autocracies use aid to finance patronage (an income 
effect); and that as remittances increase private consumption, governments divert 
expenditures from the provision of welfare to private spending (a substitution effect). Both 
mechanisms result in extra resources for regimes to fund patronage. However, as noted 
above, inflows of aid – if fungible – accrue directly to the state while individual remittances 
accrue largely to households. Hence, these two income flows may have distinct (even 
opposite) effects on democratization. Moreover, by focusing on how autocracies differ from 
democracies this research ignores the question of how regimes in different autocratic contexts 
benefit from or are harmed by remittance flows. The next section discusses the proposed 
mechanisms linking remittances to the prospects of democratic change in different autocratic 
regimes and advances a theory to explain why remittances further democracy in party-based 
dictatorships. 
 
Remittances and Autocratic Regime Survival 
 
Are some regimes more vulnerable to workers’ remittances? Autocratic regimes differ along 
many dimensions, such as the size of their support coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), 
the group from which elite supporters are selected (Geddes 1999), and the extent to which 
they coopt potential opponents with policy concessions (Gandhi 2008). These characteristics 
influence a regime’s durability and its vulnerability to domestic and foreign shocks. We argue 
that foreign remittances destabilize autocracies by reducing citizens’ dependence on 
government transfers and public goods. By giving individuals and households an exit option 
from the regime’s patronage network, remittances sever the clientelistic link between voters 
and incumbent dictators causing defections from their support coalition. Further, by 
increasing the resources of opposition parties and groups, remittances may increase the 
capacity of these parties to challenge the regime in autocratic elections. 
 These mechanisms, we argue, are more likely to occur in dictatorships that hold 
multiparty elections regularly and rely primarily on broad-based distribution of goods to 
purchase the loyalty of large coalitions and deter investment in the opposition. Concretely, 
remittances should undermine the capacity of dominant party regimes to mobilize political 
support by reducing voters’ dependency on state-delivered goods. 
                                                          
10
 See Bearce and Hutnick (2011) for a discussion of the impact of immigration on democratization. 
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 Dominant party regimes are dictatorships in which “a party organization exercises 
some power over the leader at least part of the time, controls the career paths of officials, 
organizes the distribution of benefits to supporters, and mobilizes citizens to vote and show 
support for party leaders in other ways” (Geddes 1999, 124). The latter two features help us 
understand how remittances may weaken these regimes. Dominant party dictatorships tend to 
have broader and deeper support coalitions than other regimes; and their survival therefore 
depends not only on institutionalized power-sharing agreements and the provision of private 
goods to top party officials and other elites (patronage), but also on the delivery of (often 
local) public goods to larger segments of the population (clientelism) aimed at mobilizing 
mass support (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Malesky, Abrami 
and Zheng 2011). Thus, parties not only serve to channel elites’ demands and credibly share 
power with significant groups, but also work as large clientelistic machines through which 
benefits are distributed in an effort to mobilize supporters (Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007; 
2010; Pepinsky 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010).
11
 The capacity to organize the distribution of 
beneﬁts to supporters is made possible by the party’s ability to politicize public resources 
which can then be transformed into patronage goods (Greene 2010, 808). This usually results 
in party regimes having large public sectors (Desai, Olofsgard and Yousef 2009; Greene 
2010). 
 The party monopoly over state resources makes it possible for the regime to control 
access to public housing, social services, property, fertilizers, subsidies, scholarships, jobs, 
and even food. And, most importantly, it allows the incumbent to make this access 
conditional on support for the regime party. This ensures that important segments of society 
are economically dependent on the regime (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). Benefits to citizens 
can take the form of private goods. For example, public housing programs enacted by the 
ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore have been a key source of support and votes 
for the regime since 1960. During elections in Malaysia, workers from the ruling party, the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), visit rural households to dispense cash 
payments to supporters and deter opponent mobilization (Pepinsky 2007, 144). But most 
commonly, the benefits delivered from dominant parties take the form of targeted public 
goods and services. In Malaysia, federal politicians distributed grants for rural development 
to local clients to reward support for UMNO (Pepinsky 2007). Blaydes (2011, 74) shows that 
during Mubarak’s rule in Egypt, areas that voted for the opposition saw little improvement in 
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 As Magaloni and Kricheli (2010, 124) and Levitsky and Way (2010, 62) note, both functions are interwoven: 
mobilization of mass support is essential to deter defections from within the elite. 
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sewerage and water coverage between the mid 1980s and 1990s. Under PRI rule in Mexico, 
PRONASOL funds, mainly consisting of public works targeting municipalities, were 
systematically directed to ensure voters’ loyalty in contested municipalities and withdrawn 
from those supporting the opposition (Magaloni 2006). 
 Individuals receive targeted benefits and public goods and services in exchange for 
supporting the regime. This support can take the form of tacit acquiescence or party 
membership, but it most often involves endorsing the ruling party in elections. Elections are 
not uncommon in dictatorships; indeed a majority of dictatorships held multiparty elections in 
the past decade (Hyde and Marinov 2012; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Almost all dominant 
party regimes hold regular national elections, and these regimes hold elections more 
frequently than other types of autocracies (Geddes 2003). Autocrats use elections to deal with 
diﬀerent kinds of threats and intend to win them (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). 
Consequently, among other strategies such as voter intimidation and restrictions on 
opposition parties, party regimes exploit their resource advantage to fund clientelistic 
practices – where ruling parties exchange votes for material benefits and services – and to 
enjoy a privileged economic and media position during electoral campaigns (Dixit and 
Londegran 1996; Magaloni 2006; Greene 2010). 
 The previous section identified three mechanisms through which remittances may 
foster political change: severing clientelistic links between citizens and the ruling party; 
increasing funding for opposition parties and groups; and social remittances, or the spillover 
of civic and democratic values. Our hypothesis suggests that remittances should undermine 
autocratic survival in dominant party regimes principally through the income effect of 
remittances, and possibly through an increase in resources available to opposition parties. We 
argue that remittances weaken party regimes by reducing citizens’ dependence on clientelistic 
transfers, and thus increase their economic autonomy, namely their “ability to earn a living 
independent of the state” (McMann 2006, 28). By increasing private income, remittances 
reduce the marginal utility of state-provided targeted benefits as well as local public goods 
and services. 
 This argument builds on the stylized fact that remittances increase household 
consumption to acquire goods and thus represent a substitute for goods provided by the 
regime. Existing research shows that recipient households use remittance income to finance 
private consumption but also investments in education, health, agriculture, and business 
(World Bank 2006a, 2006b; Fajnzylber and López 2007; Chami et al. 2008). Additionally, 
remittances enable citizens to obtain local public goods that substitute for government 
10 
 
welfare and infrastructure expenditures. For example, Adida and Girod (2011) find that 
Mexican households use remittances to purchase access to public services, such as sanitation 
and clean water, undermining the state monopoly on the provision of these goods. In Yemen, 
during the 1970s, local cooperatives used remittances to invest in road construction, schools, 
clinics, and farming projects (Chaudhry 1989, 133-134). In Senegal, migrant associations 
(dahiras) use remittances to fund projects and social services in their communities of origin 
“without having to rely on state intervention” (Diedhiou 2011, 6). These examples suggest 
that remittances provide households and individuals with an ‘exit’ from the regime’s 
clientelistic network (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast 2003; Ahmed 2011; Pfutze 
2012). 
 Two requisite conditions underpin the logic of the income effect: (1) remittance 
recipients care about ideological preferences; and (2) the regime cannot substantially expand 
its budget by extracting revenue from remittances, which can then be used to buy political 
support from remittance households. The first condition is a standard assumption in models 
of clientelism, where voter utility is a positive function of income and a negative function of 
support for the regime/incumbent party as captured by the distance between their own 
ideological position and that of the party they support. Hence, clientelistic transfers decrease 
(to zero at the limit) as an individual’s support for the regime increases or is ideologically 
closer to the incumbent party. Transfers, in these models, are the price the regime pays to 
alter the individuals’ political behavior.12 As Magaloni and Kricheli (2010, 128) argue, 
“[c]itizens with alternative sources of income can better afford to make ‘ideological 
investments’ in democratization and oppose the regime.” Likewise, McMann (2006) posits 
that ‘economic autonomy’ can explain citizens’ willingness to challenge local authorities 
instead of self-censoring their preferences. Further, poorer voters are more easily trapped by 
clientelistic networks, as lower incomes reduce the price the regime must pay in exchange for 
support. Substantial evidence suggests that remittances benefit the poor and help reduce 
poverty.
13
 By increasing income and thus the monetary value of transfers needed to buy 
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 See, for example, Pfutze (2013) for a formalization of this argument. 
13
 Fajnzylber and López (2007) show that Mexican remittance recipients are predominantly poor, with 61 
percent of the households that report receiving remittances falling in the first quintile of non-remittances 
income, whereas only 4 percent of them are in the top quintile. Further, this report states that “once we take into 
account remittances income, recipient households significantly climb the income ladder. In fact, after we take 
into account the role of remittances, only 10 percent of the households that receive them belong to the lowest 
quintile of the income distribution. In contrast, on the basis of total income, more than 30 percent of the 
households receiving remittances would now be in the highest income quintile. Thus, this aggregate analysis 
indicates that remittances seem to have a positive impact on the incomes of the poor” (Fajnzylber and López 
11 
 
support, remittances weaken state clientelism, lowering the marginal utility of such transfers 
and increasing the importance of ideological preferences in voting and other political 
decisions. 
 The second condition is that the regime cannot substantially augment its resources by 
capturing remittances, which can then be used to offset the increase in the price of continued 
support. Numerous studies agree that remittances are largely non-taxable (Chaudhry 1989; 
Abdih et al. 2012; Pfutze 2012; 2013; Ahmed 2012). The World Bank (2006b, 93), for 
example, notes that “[m]ost remittance-receiving countries today do not impose taxes on 
incoming remittances.” In practice, remittances are rarely directly taxed because they are 
highly elastic to the tax rate as remitters can easily evade formal controls (Eckstein 2010). 
Thus, directly taxing remittances is likely to result in fewer remittances sent through formal 
channels (Freund and Spatafora 2008). For this reason, we follow the extant research in 
suggesting that remittances are generally not taxable and do not substantially increase non-
democratic governments’ revenues.14 
 Empirical tests of this argument in Mexico show that remittances decrease votes cast 
for the incumbent and benefit the opposition by weakening of clientelistic ties (Pfutze 2012; 
2013). Dahou and Foucher (2009, 17) concur, noting that “[t]he shift of the Senegalese 
economy from groundnuts to migration and its increasing dependence on resources generated 
abroad could be seen as the final stage in the process of ending the hegemony once enjoyed 
by the state over Senegalese society.” Senegal transitioned to democracy in 2000 when the 
incumbent Socialist Party lost the presidential election. However, we lack systematic tests of 
this argument for a large number of autocracies. 
 Thus, we expect remittances to increase the likelihood of democratic transition. We 
should find the strongest support for this expectation in dominant party dictatorships as 
opposed to other autocracies because the former typically: (1) have organized opportunities 
for collective action and the expression of dissent, particularly via elections (Geddes 2003); 
and (2) have broader and deeper support coalitions comprising poor households in which we 
expect the income effect of remittances to operate most strongly. To explore the proposed 
mechanism linking remittances to democratization, we further examine whether remittances 
alter electoral behavior in autocracies in a way that punishes the incumbent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2007, 33). Adams and Page (2005) also show that remittances reduce the level and severity of poverty in 
developing countries, while other cross-country studies provide similar evidence (IMF 2005; Ratha et al. 2011). 
14
 Our analysis in Appendix E using a sample of autocracies finds no evidence that remittances increase tax 
revenue. 
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 First, weakening clientelism permits individuals to revise their evaluation of the 
government and express their true preferences about the regime. When the utility of 
registering disapproval of the regime – given remittances – is larger than that of supporting it, 
expressing dissent can not be too costly. Dominant party regimes are both less repressive 
(Davenport 2007) and more likely to have regular, institutionalized mechanisms for 
leadership turnover that typically occur through elections (Geddes 2003). If the ruling party 
loses an election, this generally leads to a democratic transition. In other regimes, in contrast, 
destabilizing dissent is more likely to take the form of contentious collective action (Ulfelder 
2005). 
 Second, dominant party regimes have broader winning coalitions than other 
autocracies and politicize public resources to mobilize support. To retain power, the regime 
party typically wins elections. Broader support coalitions in these dictatorships are more 
likely to contain poorer households that rely on remittances. In many countries, the share of 
households that receive remittances is substantial.
15
 Further, the positive income effect of 
remittances may not be limited to direct recipients, as foreign income can have multiplier 
effects leading to improvements in the living conditions of non-migrant households as well 
(World Bank 2006b). These spillover effects should increase “environmental economic 
autonomy” (McMann 2006). Through the income mechanism, remittances should undermine 
clientelistic ties and make some individuals and localities more likely to manifest disapproval 
or withdraw their support for the regime party. Elections can reflect the loss of political 
support from the coalition, as a decline in turnout for the incumbent party may lead to 
electoral victory for opposition parties, as occurred in Mexico and Senegal in 2000. 
 Other dictatorships – particularly personalist regimes – also rely on the distribution of 
benefits to supporters, but they are more likely to have a relatively small coalition comprised 
mainly of individuals with family and ethnic ties to the leader (Geddes 2003). In contrast, 
party regimes more often coopt large groups of potential opponents into the support coalition 
or rely on large preexisting organizations such as labor unions or independence movements 
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 Data for some relevant cases in our sample suggest as much. More than 25 percent of Haiti’s households 
received remittances in 2001 (Fajnzylber and López 2007). Survey data from 2004 in Mexico indicate 21 
percent of Mexicans received remittances (González et al. 2011, 99-100). More than 60 percent of those 
interviewed affirmed having a relative living in the U.S., and one third reported that remittances represent half 
or more of total household income. In Senegal, recent data suggests that 32 percent of households receive 
remittances regularly (Orozco, Burgess and Massardier 2010). According to a recent Gallup survey, by 2009-10 
the percentage of households receiving remittances in Mexico was 7 percent; 17 percent in Paraguay; 7 percent 
in Serbia; 22 percent in Senegal; 8 percent in Kenya; 9 percent in Sri Lanka; 22 percent in Niger; and roughly 5 
percent in Indonesia (http://bit.ly/k5plfa [accessed 28 July 2013]). Finally, official remittance figures may 
underestimate the true number due to the extensive use of informal channels of sending remittances (World 
Bank 2006b). 
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(Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Geddes 1999; Smith 2005). In personalist dictatorships, 
which typically have smaller support coalitions than party dictatorships, this group is less 
likely to contain poorer individuals whose main income comes from remittances. The 
political support of relatively lower income supporters is therefore less likely to be necessary 
to retain power in non-party based regimes. Further, benefits accruing to each member of a 
personalist coalition are private goods and thus substantially larger (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003). It is therefore less likely that utility from remittances exceeds the benefits obtained by 
supporting the regime. Thus, even though patronage politics is central to the logic of 
personalist rule, we do not expect remittances to undermine the patronage links between 
regime supporters and the dictator in personalist regimes.
16
 In military regimes, patronage 
may be present too but it is not the main instrument such regimes use to retain power. Rather, 
repression and institutional power-sharing between branches or factions within the military 
are (Davenport 2007; Geddes, Frantz and Wright 2014). 
 There may be other mechanisms through which remittances enhance the prospects of 
democratization, particularly in dominant party regimes. However, these mechanisms are 
likely to strengthen our argument. For example, migrant diasporas can directly influence 
political events in sending countries by disseminating information, framing political issues, 
financing candidates and parties, and lobbying foreign governments and international 
organizations. As O’Mahony (2013, 805) notes, “[p]olitical contributions may be given 
directly to parties by migrants or passed on to politicians by migrants’ families.” Thus, 
remittances may work in conjunction with migrant diasporas that help finance and mobilize 
domestic opposition groups. 
    The influence of augmented political resources for opposition mobilization should 
differ across autocratic contexts as well. Regular elections in dominant party regimes often pit 
legal opposition parties against the incumbent. The ruling party wins these elections because 
it enjoys resource advantages thanks to its monopoly access to public resources and state-
controlled institutions such as the media (Magaloni 2006; Greene 2010). Excluded from such 
resources, opposition parties can greatly benefit from foreign contributions, increasing their 
ability to compete for office, thus facilitating democratic transition. Hence, in dominant party 
regimes remittances may undermine the resource advantage ruling parties enjoy by providing 
opposition groups with funds they are unable to generate domestically. 
                                                          
16
 We confirm these expectations about the influence of remittances in personalist dictatorships in Appendix 
Table A-5. 
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 For example, in Ethiopia opposition parties that had boycotted the 1995 and 2000 
elections won 172 seats in the 2005 parliamentary election, while the ruling EPRDF retained 
“only” 327 seats – more than 150 fewer seats than it had won in the 2000 election. As Lyons 
(2007, 540) emphasizes, “[t]he two main opposition coalitions that participated in the May 
2005 elections had clear roots in the diasporas of North America and Europe.” In fact, most 
of the campaign funding for one of the main opposition coalition groups, the Coalition for 
Unity and Democracy, came from diaspora communities (Arriola 2008, 120). 
 In contrast, in regimes that are less likely to have regular and competitive mechanisms 
for leadership succession, remittances may simply increase the capacity of outside groups to 
forcibly oust the regime. In autocratic contexts where opposition groups and parties are 
banned, diaspora funds may finance insurgencies (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004).17 While 
remittances in these cases may increase the prospects of a forced, or even violent, regime 
change, these regime ousters usually lead to a subsequent autocracy and not to democracy 
(Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014). 
 Finally, emigration can also foster social learning by transmitting ideas and 
information about social norms, including democratic values, to those left behind (Levitt 
1998; Pérez-Armendáriz 2014). However, the social learning mechanism would operate 
provided emigrants settle in advanced, well governed democracies, which is far from the rule 
in many developing countries (World Bank 2011). Further, emigration – rather than 
economic remittances – should be a better measure of transferring values because out-
migration is more likely to reflect political preferences as citizens leave when they dislike the 
state of political affairs at home (Hiskey, Montalvo and Orcés 2014). Thus, their departure 
may decrease turnout for the incumbent (Pfutze 2013). Addressing the multiple mechanisms 
through which emigration may influence democratization requires time-series data on 
emigration, but existing data is low quality, with poor coverage for most autocratic 
countries.
18
 Yet, we acknowledge that emigration can be a potentially confounding variable 
and show that the influence of remittances is robust to controlling for net migration, which is 
the best available measure given our research design. 
                                                          
17
 Available data on formal remittances is less likely to capture the informal funds accruing to outside groups 
from diasporas (Regan and Frank 2014). In Appendix Table A-6, we test whether formal remittances are 
associated with an increased likelihood of autocratic transition; as expected, we find no significant effect. To 
account for the fact that remittances may facilitate political protests, we control for the occurrence of protest 
events in some specifications. 
18
 Only a few published studies account for emigration empirically (Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Pfutze 2013). 
This research relies on a cross section of municipalities, which allows the authors to use census data. We cannot 
follow the same strategy with times-series cross-country data. 
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Data and Methods 
 
Whereas prior research explores how remittances influence government change, our focus is 
democratic transition.
19
 These regime transitions occur when the ruling elite lose power and 
the new government that replaces the fallen regime is democratic. When some autocratic 
regimes fall, they are replaced by a new autocracy, as was the case during the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution when a theocratic regime overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty. We do not examine 
these types of autocratic regime failures because they rarely come about via an election, 
which is the proposed mechanism through which we expect remittances to inﬂuence 
autocratic stability. More importantly, the measure of democratic transition excludes 
government changes that occur during the lifetime of an autocratic regime. “Government 
change” in many autocracies occurs when one leader replaces another via an institutionalized 
mechanism for rotating the leadership of the regime. When these events do not coincide with 
regime failure, they are often successful maneuvers by incumbent elites to prolong their rule 
and should not be interpreted as political instability. Examples from regimes in Mexico and 
Saudi Arabia illustrate. 
 In Mexico, the long dominant PRI lost its monopoly on power when an opposition 
candidate won the Presidency in 2000. During much of its nearly eight decades of rule, the 
PRI selected a new leader every six years. These leadership changes may constitute 
“government change”20 but they are not a reliable measure of autocratic instability because 
they conﬂate the leader and the regime in an autocracy where selection of new leaders is a 
regime feature that enhances its chances of survival (Magaloni 2006). 
 Similarly, the natural death of a leader may not threaten the regime with collapse, 
even though naming a new leader can constitute “government change.” Monarchies, for 
example, often have established mechanisms for leadership succession within the royal 
family. Because these regimes have dynastic political structures that institutionalize the 
selection of new leaders without jeopardizing the regime itself, they are relatively resilient 
(Herb 1999, 40-49; Menaldo 2012, 711). In Saudi Arabia, the monarchy continues in power 
                                                          
19
 Ahmed (2012), for example, uses the variable “years in office” from the Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI) which marks how long the leader or ruling party has been in power. 
20
 Government change in Mexico, according to the DPI, occurred in 1976, 1982, 1994, and 2000 but not in 
1988. Notably, the PRI split prior to the 1988 election, when Cárdenas formed the opposition Party of the 
Democratic Revolution (PRD), and the PRI used electoral fraud to win. Thus, according to this measure, 
instability in Mexico occurred every six years except during the year it faced its strongest electoral challenge 
prior to 2000. 
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despite “government changes” that occurred after King Khalid died of a heart attack in 1982 
and after King Fahd succumbed to pneumonia in 2005.
21
 The data-generating process we 
model excludes natural deaths of the leader when the regime remains in power, as we do not 
expect remittances to inﬂuence these events. 
 To test the main hypothesis, we use data from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), 
which codes two types of regime collapse: those that lead to a transition to democracy and 
those that result in a new autocratic regime.
22
 We focus on democratic transitions and treat 
transitions to a new dictatorship as right-censored. The dependent variable is coded 1 if a 
regime change that results in democracy takes place in a given year and 0 otherwise. 
Democratic transitions are relatively rare, occurring in 3 percent of observation years. 
 The main explanatory variable is worker remittances, from the World Development 
Indicators (2010), measured in constant U.S. dollars per capita (logged). To avoid reverse 
causality, we lag this variable one year. We use this measure instead of remittances as a share 
of GDP because the latter is composed of two variables – remittances and GDP – making it 
diﬃcult to disentangle which one inﬂuences transitions. For instance, sustained growth 
increases GDP, which entails a lower value of  
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
. If sustained growth – and hence lower 
values of 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 – influences stability in autocracies, we might observe a spurious correlation 
between 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 and transitions, driven by changes in the denominator (GDP) rather than the 
numerator (remittances). 
 The other main explanatory variable is party regime, which is a binary indicator from 
Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). Of the 137 regimes in the sample 39, or 29 percent, are 
party regimes.
23
 However party regimes comprise 41 percent of the sample observations 
because they tend to endure longer than many other autocracies. This variable measures 
concepts related to the electoral basis of regime support, such as: whether the regime has a 
support party with local level organizations; whether the party holds competitive intraparty 
elections; and whether party supporters include members of more than one regional, 
religious, or ethnic group (Geddes 2003). In contrast, other autocracies are categorized as 
military, monarchical, or personalist. While military regimes and monarchies have other 
organizational mechanisms for securing support and managing elite conﬂict (i.e. the military 
                                                          
21
 Even the assassination of King Faisal in 1975 “did not reflect any wider split within the royal family and did 
not disturb the equilibrium of the institution” (Herb 1999, 99). 
22
 As a robustness test, we replicate the main finding using the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) coding of 
democratic transition (Table A-3). 
23
 For the reported results we group party-hybrid regimes with pure dominant party regimes. The main results 
hold for both pure and hybrid-party regimes (Table A-5). 
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and the royal family), personalist dictatorships: tend to lack a broad-based support party; have 
leaders who create their own party rather than inherit a support party from their predecessor; 
are less likely to govern with routine elections; and if they have elections these are more 
likely to resemble plebiscites than competitive contests. 
 To test the main hypothesis, we interact the two main variables: Remit × Party. We 
test this model as well as speciﬁcations that include controls for: log GDP per capita; log 
Population; neighboring country democratization; and civil war – all lagged one year.24 Then 
we add a control variable for net migration, which helps isolate the inﬂuence of remittances 
while accounting for the net loss of citizens.
25
 Next, we test a speciﬁcation with controls for 
growth and anti-government protest.
26
 These represent alternative channels through which 
emigration might inﬂuence autocratic stability, independently of remittances. For example, 
remittances are often counter-cyclical income flows correlated with economic growth, which 
may independently influence regime survival. Last, we test a speciﬁcation that controls for 
other channels of foreign inﬂuence: foreign aid, oil rents, and capital account openness. The 
aid and oil variables are each logged, lagged two-year moving averages, while capital 
account openness is an index that measures the extent of capital controls based on the 
information from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions.
27
 We account for duration time dependence by including polynomials of regime 
duration (Carter and Signorino 2010).
28
 To model global shocks to democratization as well as 
the global trend in remittances, we include a quadratic calendar time trend. 
 Finally, we address unit heterogeneity by conditioning the explanatory variables on 
their respective unit means (?̅?𝑖). This approach is similar to directly modeling country fixed 
effects. However, we opt for the unit means approach because directly including country 
fixed effects forces a binary dependent variable model to drop highly stable autocratic 
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 GDP per capita and population data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI 2010). Neighboring 
country democratization takes three values: 0 for no neighboring country democratic transitions; 1 for one 
transition; and 2 for 2 or more, where neighbor is defined as any autocratic country with a capital city within 
4000 km of the target country. Civil war, from Gleditsch et al.(2002), takes 3 values: 0 for no civil war; 1 for at 
least one low intensity civil war; and 2 for at least one high intensity civil war. 
25
 Net migration data is from World Bank (2010), measured every five years. We use this measure for each of 
the five years following the year in which this variable is reported. 
26
 Economic growth, measured as the 2-year lagged moving average, is from World Bank (2010). Protest data is 
the lagged, logged value of the number of riots, strikes, and anti-government demonstrations, from the Banks 
data set. 
27
 Foreign aid data is constant dollars per capita from World Bank (2010); constant dollar oil and gas rents per 
capita from Ross (2008); and the capital account openness index is from Chinn and Ito (2008). 
28
 Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) show that a binary dependent variable model, such as a logit, is a similar 
estimator to standard duration models if we include controls for time dependence. 
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countries that do not democratize during the sample period.
29
 For example, a conditional logit 
drops stable regimes such as the monarchy in Jordan and dominant-party regimes in 
Botswana and China. Our approach attempts to circumvent this issue by conditioning on the 
unit means of the explanatory variables as a substitute for country fixed effects (Wooldridge 
2002, 487). In doing so, the interpretation of the explanatory variables is similar to the 
interpretation from a fixed effects model. To address any further unit heterogeneity not 
captured by the fixed effect proxy (?̅?𝑖), we estimate the equation with random effects and 
clustered standard errors.
30
 The specification is: 
 
Pr (𝑌𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑡−1 = 0) = 𝛼𝑗[𝑖] + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾?̅?𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡;     𝛼𝑗~𝑁(𝜇𝛼 , 𝜎𝛼
2);       𝜀𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑦
2)    (1) 
 
where X includes the explanatory variables, regime duration polynomials, and a time trend. 
After we present the results from this model, we examine a two-stage model that uses an 
instrument to capture exogenous variation in remittances. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 presents results for testing whether remittances increase the likelihood of democratic 
transition. The odd-numbered columns report models with no interaction while the even-
numbered columns report results that include Remit × Party. The ﬁrst two columns report 
models that include controls for party regime, duration dependence polynomials, and a 
quadratic calendar time trend. The next two include four additional variables: GDP per 
capita, Population, Civil war, and Neighbor democratization. The next two add Net 
migration; columns 7 and 8 add Economic growth and Protest; and the final two models add 
Foreign aid, Oil rents, and Capital account openness as control variables. All models include 
the unit means as explanatory variables. 
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 
 The results for remittances in party regimes are consistent: a large, positive and 
statistically signiﬁcant coefficient for the interaction term as well as for the linear 
                                                          
29
 Appendix Table A-2, columns 5 and 6 show that the main result remains when using a conditional logit, even 
though this approach drops 49 of 88 countries. Further, we test a linear probability model with country- and 
year-fixed effects, reported in columns 3 and 4 in Table A-2, again with results similar to those reported in 
Table 1. 
30
 By construction, the estimates of the main variables (i.e. not the unit means) are the same irrespective of 
whether we center these variables around the mean. 
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combination, βRemit + βRemit×Party , which estimates the marginal eﬀect of remittances in party 
regimes. This indicates that remittances in party regimes are correlated with the likelihood of 
democratic transition. Figure 2 shows the substantive result from the model in column 4. It 
depicts the simulated predicted risk of democratic transition across a range of values for 
remittances.
31
 In party regimes, increasing remittances by two standard deviations around the 
mean raises the simulated predicted risk of transition from 0.1 percent to 2.4 percent. In other 
dictatorships, this increase in remittances changes the predicted risk of transition from 1.2 
percent to 1.5 percent. 
 To test the robustness of this finding, Appendix Tables A-1 to A-3 report models that 
control for: (1) state capacity; (2) repression; (3) protest interacted with remittances; (4) using 
a remittance variable without population in the denominator; (5) using the lagged two-year 
moving average for remittances; (6) including the year means of the explanatory variables 
instead of a time trend; (7) employing a linear probability model with country- and year-ﬁxed 
effects;
32
 (8) with a conditional logit; (9) dropping Latin American countries from the 
sample; and (10) using a diﬀerent measure of democratic transition from Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland (2010). Further, Figure A-1 shows the result is robust to the exclusion of any 
country with a party-based regime. 
     
***Figure 2 about here*** 
Figure 2: Remittances and democratization. The figure depicts the simulated predicted 
probability of a democratic transition. The dotted line depicts the predicted risk of 
democratization in non-party based regimes, the dashed line depicts democratic transition 
risk for party regimes. Horizontal axis represents a range of values for remittances, with the 
shaded histogram depicting the distribution of remittances (log) in the sample, up to the 95th 
percentile. 
 
Two-stage model 
 
To address the concern that remittances are endogenously determined by political change in 
the receiving country, we use an instrument that combines information from: the time trend 
for received remittances in high-income OECD countries as well as the share of a country’s 
land that lies within 100km of a coastline and the share of land area that contains fertile soil. 
First we sum remittance receipts in high-income OECD countries (per capita constant dollars) 
                                                          
31
 The simulation sets the value of all explanatory variables (including the unit means) at their respective within-
sample mean, except for the calendar time trend which is set at 1993 and regime duration which is set at the 
median. 
32
 Figure A-2 shows the result from linear probability models with country- and year-fixed effects. 
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in each year 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑡𝑗 , where j are high-income OECD countries, none 
of which are autocracies. Remittances received by citizens in high-income OECD countries 
mostly come from other rich OECD countries. The World Bank, for example, estimates that 
83 percent of emigrants from high-income OECD countries migrate to other high-income 
OECD nations (World Bank 2011, 12). Thus domestic factors in OECD countries, such as 
economic growth and level of development, which inﬂuence remittance receipts from other 
high-income OECD countries also determine the extent to which migrants from autocratic 
countries who work in these rich OECD countries send remittances back home. Thus we find 
that the yearly average of high-income OECD remittances is correlated with remittances sent 
to non-OECD autocratic countries. Remittances received in high-income OECD countries are 
unlikely to directly inﬂuence political change in remittance-receiving autocratic countries 
except through their indirect eﬀect on remittances sent to autocratic countries. We control for 
the possibility that remittances received in OECD countries reflect global economic trends 
that also inﬂuence domestic politics in autocratic countries by adding calendar time trends.33 
 Information on the high-income OECD trend in remittances received varies by year. 
To add cross-sectional information, we weight the trend by the share of land area in the 
receiving autocratic country that lies within 100km of a coast line multiplied by the share of 
land area with fertile soil.
34
 We call this variable W RemitDistance. This strategy is similar to 
Abdih et al. (2012), who use the ratio of coastal area in a recipient country to total area as a 
cross-sectional instrument. Coastal land area is correlated with ease of emigration and 
therefore emigrant population and remittances received, while fertile soil is correlated with 
population density. But neither of these geographic features is endogenously determined by 
domestic political outcomes. Other ways through which coastal land and fertile soil might 
influence politics are captured in GDP per capita, economic growth, and civil war control 
variables.
35
 Further, we employ country ﬁxed eﬀects to directly model the inﬂuence of time 
invariant factors correlated with coastal land, such as distance from advanced market 
economies, that may also inﬂuence democratic transition. 
 There are two endogenous variables, Remit and Remit × Party. Therefore we add the 
interaction between W RemitDistance and Party to the excluded instrument set. To mimic the 
empirical approach used earlier, we employ a linear probability model with country ﬁxed-
eﬀects to account for unit-heterogeneity. This allows us to easily estimate the model with two 
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 The Appendix includes a model with year fixed-effects, with similar results. 
34
 Data on these variables is from Nunn and Puga (2012). See Appendix B for further information on the 
instrument construction. 
35
 In Appendix Table B-2 we show the results remain when controlling for trade level. 
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endogenous variables and unit eﬀects.36 The speciﬁcation includes the following control 
variables: Party regime, GDP per capita, Population, Civil war, Neighbor democratization, 
Net Migration, calendar time period dummies for each 5-year period, and duration time, as 
well as country fixed effects. 
 
***Table 2 about here *** 
 
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 reports the ﬁrst stage regression. W RemitDistance is positive and 
statistically signiﬁcant, indicating a strong correlation between the excluded instrument and 
the endogenous variable (F-statistic>10).
37
 The next column estimates the model without the 
interaction term; Remit is positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero. The ﬁnal column 
estimates the model with two endogenous variables; and the estimate for Remit × Party is 
positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero. Further, the F-statistic is still larger than 10 with 
two endogenous variables, and the linear combination of βRemit + βRemit×Party is positive and 
diﬀerent from zero. 
To test the robustness of this ﬁnding, the Appendix (Table B-2) reports models: (1) 
without control variables; (2) without net migration; (3) with trade added; (4) with economic 
growth added; (5) with growth and protest added; (6) with growth, aid, oil, and capital 
account openness added; (7) with year ﬁxed-eﬀects; and (8) dropping ﬁrst stage outliers. The 
main ﬁnding remains in each of these tests. This evidence is consistent with the expectation 
that remittances increase the chances of democratic transition in dominant party regimes. 
 
Mechanisms 
 
Our theoretical expectations focus on how remittances influence the prospects of democratic 
transition by reducing electoral support for incumbent regimes. To this point, we have shown 
that remittances are associated with a higher likelihood of democratic transition in party-
based autocracies. To further explore the proposed causal mechanism, we first look directly 
at the electoral connection by examining whether remittances are associated with less 
electoral support for incumbent parties. This test focuses on executive elections in autocracies 
to establish a direct link between remittances, elections, and democratic transitions. Second, 
we test whether remittances are also associated with transitions from one autocratic regime to 
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 An instrumental variables probit does not converge with two endogenous variables. 
37
 We report the Kleibergen Paap rank Wald F statistic. 
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another, what we call autocratic transitions. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the ouster of the 
Mobutu regime in the former Zaire in1997 by rebel insurgents, and the military coup by a 
junior oﬃcer in Guinea in 2008 are examples of these autocratic transitions. This test helps 
establish whether remittances are simply a tool to help opponents oust autocratic regimes by 
any means or whether remittances mostly harm autocracies by furthering the prospects of 
democratic transition. 
 
The electoral connection 
 
Remittances, we argue, facilitate democratization in party-based regimes because these 
dictatorships are the most likely to rely on broad and deep clientelistic networks to buy 
loyalty. Control of state resources allows the party to reward loyalty through clientelism and 
targeted public goods. 
 Case study research on party regimes shows how they use clientelism to mobilize 
voters while punishing opposition supporters (Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007; Pepinsky 2007). 
Poor citizens are generally more likely to sell their votes to political patrons since they place 
a higher value on consumption goods and their votes are relatively cheap compared with 
higher income voters (Dixit and Londegran 1996). As Magaloni and Kricheli (2010, 128) 
note, “this punishment regime is particularly eﬀective at trapping poor voters into supporting 
the dictatorship because their livelihood depends on state transfers.” Because they rely on 
government transfers for consumption, citizens may vote for incumbents despite their true 
political preferences. For instance, Blaydes (2011) ﬁnds that voters in Egypt’s 2005 election 
were often induced by material rewards; and Chhibber (1996) notes that the National 
Liberation Front (FLN) dominated Algerian politics for three decades by building a large 
coalition of supporters with oil-funded goods. 
 Remittances can break clientelist ties by providing extra income to households. 
Because enjoying the regime’s spoils depends on showing electoral support for the 
incumbent, increasing remittances should inﬂuence the likelihood of democratization by 
changing electoral behavior.
38
 In particular, recipients in party dictatorships should be less 
likely to vote for incumbent parties as this extra income increases. Citizens may vote for 
opposition parties or simply abstain from voting, thereby reducing turnout for the ruling 
party. Indeed, Pfutze (2012) shows that remittances reduced turnout for the PRI in the 2000-
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 Remittances may also influence stability via anti-regime protest. Appendix D provides some evidence that 
remittances are associated with a higher incidence of protest in party regimes. 
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2002 elections. In Senegal, Galvan (2001, 60) notes that “the 2000 elections sealed the 
collapse of the highways-for-ndigel patronage ties between the Socialists and the 
marabouts.”39 
 Even though autocratic rulers use elections strategically to prolong their rule 
(Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009), elections may lead to liberalizing outcomes 
(Howard and Roessler 2006; Donno 2013). Indeed, elections have been the most common 
way through which party regimes have democratized since 1946 and especially since the end 
of the Cold War. Following our argument above, we expect remittances are associated with 
lower vote shares for the incumbent regime, which may translate into an electoral loss and a 
higher likelihood of democratic transition. 
 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
 
 To test this proposition, we examine remittances and changes in incumbent vote 
share, collecting data on incumbent vote shares for each election and the prior election.
40
 The 
main dependent variable is the change in vote share for the incumbent in a direct executive 
election; the measure of remittances is the lagged three-year moving average.
41
 The base 
speciﬁcation includes a control variable for lagged economic growth because growth and 
remittances are correlated; and domestic growth can inﬂuence incumbent vote share. The 
speciﬁcation accounts for ceiling (and ﬂoor) eﬀects by including the incumbent vote share in 
the prior election as a control variable. The estimator is a generalized linear model with a 
logit link function that accounts for the bounded nature of the dependent variable. We cluster 
standard errors by country. Even-numbered columns include the interaction between Remit 
and Party.  
 The results in Table 3 indicate a strong negative correlation between remittances and 
changes in incumbent vote share. The ﬁrst column reports the base model, with no 
interaction; the estimate for Remit is negative and statistically diﬀerent from zero suggesting 
that as remittances increase, the incumbent vote share declines. The second column reports 
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 Marabouts are Murid religious leaders while ndigels are edicts of these leaders that were also used to instruct 
Murids to vote for the regime party (Galvan 2001). This electoral defeat was largely brought about by the 
growing financial autonomy of Murids caused by remittances (Dahou and Foucher 2009; Diedhiou 2011). The 
Murids had traditionally supported the hegemonic Socialist Party. However, since the 1990s “the marabouts 
adopted a stance of political neutrality, neither supporting the ruling party nor mobilizing support for opposition 
candidates” (Galvan 2001, 59). 
40
 See Appendix C for information on the coding rules, sources, and data. 
41
 See Table C-2 for results from a full error-correction specification. 
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the interaction speciﬁcation: the negative relationship between remittances and vote shares is 
concentrated among party-based regimes. Figure 3 depicts the substantive ﬁnding; an 
increase in remittances from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile is associated with a decline of 
roughly 14 percent in the incumbent vote share in party regimes. In other regimes, the 
remittance eﬀect is negligible. 
 Additional columns report robustness tests. Columns 3 and 4 report results from 
models with additional control variables: migration, government spending, civil war, regime 
duration, and a calendar time trend.
42
 Adding these variables does not materially change the 
main ﬁnding. The next two columns include region- and year-ﬁxed eﬀects, while the ﬁnal 
two columns model country ﬁxed eﬀects and drop the lagged dependent variable. This last 
speciﬁcation is a diﬃcult test for the theory because the average number of elections per 
country in the sample is roughly three (see Table C-1). Thus the coeﬃcient estimate for 
remittances can be interpreted as the marginal eﬀect of a change in the deviation from the in-
sample country-mean level of remittances. Further robustness tests in the Appendix indicate 
that the result remains in a full error-correction model, when excluding potential outliers, and 
estimating a robust regression model.
43
 
 
*** Figure 3 about here*** 
Figure 3: Remittances and incumbent electoral support. Estimates from column 2, Table 3. 
 
Remittances, elections, and democratic transitions. In the Appendix we provide further 
evidence linking remittances to democratic transitions via elections. We return to the 
democratic transition model (equation 1) to examine whether the observed remittance eﬀect 
occurs in election years or non-election years. First, we test speciﬁcations that include a 
binary indicator for executive Election years.
44
 We then interact Election with remittances, as 
well as with party regimes and the interaction between party regimes and remittances. We 
stress that this strategy is not a good one for assessing how elections inﬂuence democratic 
transitions because the information used to code Election is the exact same political event as 
the information used to code democratic transition (i.e. the election event when the 
incumbent loses). Thus, the exact same event is included on both sides of the model, making 
                                                          
42
 Government spending is lagged one year, with data obtained from World Bank (2010). 
43
 See Table C-2. 
44
 Results reported in Table A-7. The election variable indicates whether the final round of an election in which 
the seat of the incumbent is contested took place in an observation country-year. Data are from Hyde and 
Marinov (2012). 
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interpretation of Election nonsensical. However, this can be a useful exercise to examine 
whether the cases in which there is the expected correlation between remittances and 
democratic transition (in party regimes) occur in election years or non-election years. 
 Second, we restrict the sample to election years and then estimate a model to show 
that remittances are correlated with democratic transitions, but only in party regimes. The 
estimator is a random effects probit with clustered errors, and controls for the unit means 
from the full sample. Thus the remittance coefficients can be interpreted as the time-varying 
deviation from the country mean level of remittances – similar to the interpretation in the 
main reported results in Table 1. 
Both strategies yield findings consistent with our expectations: remittances are only 
associated with democratic transition in party regimes in election years; and restricting the 
sample to election years, remittances are only associated with democratic transition in party 
regimes. 
 
Autocratic transitions 
 
Next, we examine whether remittances are associated with autocratic regime collapse that 
results in a transition to a new autocracy: autocratic transitions. The Iranian Revolution of 
1979, the ouster of the Mobutu regime in the former Zaire in 1997 by rebel insurgents, and 
the military coup by a junior officer in Guinea in 2008 are examples of these regime collapse 
events. We examine the same models as those reported in Tables 1 and 2, but switch the 
dependent variable from democratic transition to autocratic transition. Appendix Tables A-6 
and B-3 report the results. We find no evidence that remittances are associated with 
autocratic transitions. This should not be surprising because examination of these regime 
collapse cases shows that only 3 of the 34 autocratic transitions entail any sort of election (the 
subsequent regime in each of these three cases is not a democracy).
45
 The other 31 regime 
collapse events are popular revolutions, military coups, and insurgents or rebels toppling the 
regime. In contrast, 31 of 49 democratic transition events entail elections. This provides 
additional support to the claim that remittances influence autocratic regime survival by 
increasing the prospect of democratic transition. 
 
 
                                                          
45
 Table S-3 in the Appendix lists each collapse event in the sample period; whether it is coded as a democratic 
or autocratic transition; and whether the event is an election. 
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*** Figure 4 about here *** 
Figure 4: Remittances and regime transitions. The left panel depicts the marginal effect of 
remittances on the likelihood of democratic transition, using the observed values approach. 
The marginal effect simulation reflects an increase in remittances from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile. The right panel depicts the marginal effect on the likelihood of autocratic 
transition. 
 
 Figure 4 contrasts the substantive ﬁnding from the democratic and autocratic 
transition models. The left panel depicts the substantive ﬁnding for the democratic transition 
model reported in column 4, Table 1, using the observed values approach suggested by 
Hanmer and Kalkan (2013).The estimates correspond to an increase in remittances from the 
25th percentile of the remittance distribution to the 75th percentile. In party regimes, this 
change in remittances is associated with a 12 percent increase in the predicted probability of 
democratic transition, while in other regimes a similar change in remittances results in a 
negligible change in the predicted risk of transition. The right panel shows the substantive 
ﬁnding from the same model but with autocratic transition as the dependent variable (column 
4, Table A-6). There is no relationship between remittances and these types of regime 
collapse events. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This article contributes to our understanding of the impact of migration and remittances in the 
politics of sending countries, adding to the expanding literature on how international 
migration shapes domestic politics. The evidence in this paper suggests that remittances do 
not stabilize autocracies, or at least not all of them. Rather, we show that remittance ﬂows 
jeopardize autocratic rule by increasing the prospects of a democratic transition. Using data 
over a 35-year period covering the third wave of democratization, we ﬁnd that remittances 
are associated with a higher likelihood of democratic transition in party dictatorships and a 
lower vote share for incumbent parties in autocratic elections. 
 Together, these ﬁndings stand at odds with recent research which suggests that 
remittances stabilize autocracies (Ahmed 2012). Three possibilities may account for these 
divergent ﬁndings. First, we look at remittances separately from other types of non-tax 
revenue, such as foreign aid. Our measure of this concept does not conﬂate changes in worker 
remittances with changes in the receiving country’s economy, which are also likely to 
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inﬂuence autocratic stability. Second, we focus on democratic transitions instead of all 
government changes in autocracies. The events we model, therefore, do not include 
institutionalized rotation of leaders atop an autocratic regime or the natural death of a leader – 
unless these also entail the regime being ousted from power. Finally, our account of how 
remittances inﬂuence autocratic stability emphasizes an electoral connection (Pfutze 2012). 
Some dictatorships rely on retaining the support of a broad-based electoral coalition and 
employ a range of state resources to secure their continued support. This is a qualitative 
characteristic of autocracy measured with a binary indicator for party-based regimes. 
 We argue that remittances can change the electoral behavior of voters in regimes with 
a broad-based electoral connection to their supporters, namely party dictatorships. If 
remittances reduce electoral support for incumbents in these regimes, they should also 
increase the prospects of democratization. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with this proposition: 
remittances are associated with a higher likelihood of democratic transition in party regimes. 
In other dictatorships, however, remittances appear to have little inﬂuence on transitions. We 
then investigate how remittances change incumbent vote shares in autocratic elections, and 
ﬁnd that higher remittance ﬂows are associated with a decline in electoral support for 
incumbent parties, but again only in dominant party autocracies.
46
 
 Our explanation for how remittances inﬂuence autocratic stability does not rule out 
the possibility that they allow dictatorships to reduce public goods spending in favor of 
particularistic spending on core elites. Indeed, this may be one reason why remittances do not 
appear to inﬂuence the prospects of democratization in a range of non-party based 
dictatorships, including personalist autocracies.
47
 However, central to understanding the 
spending substitution eﬀect is the task of identifying the core regime elite in diﬀerent 
autocratic contexts as well as the marginal inﬂuence of increased private spending on their 
loyalty to the dictator. 
 Our ﬁndings not only have implications for research on the consequences of 
international ﬂows for domestic democratic development but also inform important policy 
questions. Because dominant party autocracies have been some of the most resilient 
dictatorships in the past six decades, our ﬁndings suggest that migration policies which 
enhance the ﬂow of remittances to sending autocratic countries may be an increasingly 
inﬂuential tool of foreign policy for wealthy democracies interested in promoting democracy 
                                                          
46
 Moreover, the alternative hypothesis that remittances facilitate regime durability by easing dissatisfaction 
with incumbents does not find support in dominant party regimes. 
47
 Table A-5 shows remittances are not associated with an increased likelihood of democratic transition in 
personalist autocracies. 
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abroad. However, because remittances are most likely to further democratization by eroding 
electoral support for incumbent autocratic parties, they may contribute little to the political 
change in regimes such as China’s that do not hold multiparty elections at the national level. 
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